t This chapter analyzes the possibility of manipulation in futures markets, concentrating on the effects that manipulation may have on their informational efficiency . We use the concept of manipulation as it arises in the study of noncooperative games with imperfect information .
Forward and futures markets illustrate sharply many of the issues central to the economics of uncertainty and of imperfect information . ) Clearly, future economic activity is in area in which conditions of uncertainty and of imperfect information arise quite naturally . With respect to uncertainty about future conditions, the existence of ,I Full set of future markets or the equivalent is seen as a precondition Ior attaining allocative efficiency . One j of the major roles of such markets is to allow agents to trade so as to allocate risks optimally among themselves, according to each agent's altitudes toward risk . In this view, lutures markets exist because they allow traders with different risk positions toward the future to trade with each other for mutual gain (see, for example, I:?dwards 1 1182) .
n second, (IifTerent . role of Ititures markets is akin to that of a general financial market . In this role, the futures market is seen as an instrument for gathering and distributing infrnmation about future market conditions to ( other parts of the economy (Grossman 1977) . This information is of importance for decision making about inventories . outputs and investment, as well ' as in financial transactions . ]'lie performance of futures markets in this sense is measured by their informational efficiency . We are concerned here with a particular issue concerning informational efficiency . the manipulation of futures markets . This subject has long been ' of practical importance, hill has not until now commanded attention in the literature . The issue of manipulation arises, for instance, in the study of what are institutionally known as squeezes or corners . In both cases, in implicit assumption is that some agents control certain strategic information and that they Inay use such control to influence the market to their advantage-lor t instance, through their impact on prices . We assume that agents are not fully informed about the characteristics of all other traders (such as their de-
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193 mands) and that each agent may use his private information to influence prices to his possible advantage . The context is therefore that of games xvith imperfect information, and we explore the possibility of manipulation when agents play in a noncooperative fashion-that is, through Nash equilibrium strategies . By manipulation, I refer to the strategic use of information and signals to obtain more advantageous outcomes . I shall illustrate certain examples of manipulation, such its market s(iueezes : the temporary aberration of the futures prices and spot prices for strategic advantage . 'The first section establishes the concepts of games with imperfect information and of manipulation . A brief discussion of the literature is given . A class of games is then used to explore the extent to which the problem of manipulation is likely to arise in these markets . One theorem shows that manipulation arises quite generally, and with it, the informational efficiency in these markets may decrease . Using these games as examples we then set up the problem of manipulation in a repeated game context-that is, games where players are assumed to play repeatedly with each other through time, even ad infinitum (Heal 197(, ) . In this latter case, the incidence of manipulation is greatly reduced . Futures markets become more efficient in their informational role .
We next examine the extent to which a futures market may be viewed as repeated games . This view depends on a number of features, including the degree of anonymity and of restrictions on entry . 1 argue that these two features are related, in the sense that more anonymity may ease entry . On the other hand, anonymity may prevent the futures market from behaving as a repeated game, thus making it more vulnerable to manipulation . 2 The problem can be summarized as follows : disclosure that is, less anonymity) may prevent manipulation and therefore improve the informational efficiency of the market . On the other hand, disclosure (less anonymity) may restrict entry, and therefore produce an efficiency loss . There is, in this sense, a tradeoff between informational efficiency and free entry .
It is often argued that the ease of entry in futures markets is a significant improvement from the conditions prevailing in more traditional forward markets . The role of the clearing houses, as discussed in Edwards (9), is in part related to preserving as much anonymity as possible in futures markets . Anonymity and free entry appear to be rather important features of futures markets . It follows that the possibility of manipulation is higher in these markets because they do not easily satisfy the characteristics of repeated games .
The conclusions are that a certain amount of market manipulation can be expected in futures market because of their informational structure, and that manipulation will have some negative effects on the informational efficiency of these markets . Self-policing measures involving some form of Manipulation and Repeated Games disclosure could decrease to a certain extent the incidence of manipulation . However, such measures carry a cost in terms of barriers to entry and the accompanying efficiency losses . It seems therefore that an overall approach to the problem is to seek an optimal tradeoff between the two types of efficiency losses : informational inefficiencies and restrictions to entry .
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The concept of manipulation has been studied now for a number of years (Chichilnisky and Heal 1982) . It arises most naturally in the context of noncooperative games with imperfect information . This section summarizes the conceptual issues involved and describe briefly existing results .
Economic Games
A game is defined here by specifying four objects :
I . The strategies available to each player-that is, the strategy space S . 2 . The space of outcomes, denoted X.
3 . The payoff function (or game form) g, a function which assigns an outcome to the strategies played by the individuals . 4 . Individual characteristics, such as preferences over outcomes, that determine the strategic behavior of the players .
The term "game with imperfect information" denotes a game in which the players are not fully informed about one or more of the aspects of the game . For instance, players may be aware only of some of the strategies available to them, so they do not know their strategy space S accurately . Another typical incidence of imperfect information is when each agent is not fully aware of the characteristics of the other agents . This type of imperfect information will be most relevant here and we discuss it in some detail .
One important role of future contracts is to provide price signals that can be used by the producers and distributors to allocate real resources .
More specifically, futures prices collect and interpret the underlying eco nomic information about conditions of supply and demand and so may influence storage and inventory decisions . In the following, we shall discuss how the issue of manipulation is linked with that of the efficiency of futures markets, and also the different concepts of efficiency that emerge .
The extent to which one can rely on futures prices conveying accurate information about the market's characteristics is relevant for the efficiency of futures markets (Edwards' section 5 and 6) . Agents' characteristics, such tile outcome as preferences, influence demand, and demand affects futures prices .
'therefore . when agents' characteristics are unknown, each agent may give strategic signals to the market about these characteristics, in an attempt to shape the pricing structure to his advantage . For instance, a net sale may be considered a signal of an agent's preference . An agent may choose this signal strategically to influence prices according to his preferences . A strategy for each agent i is then a net sale s i . which is taken as a signal for the agent's preference . This signal will affect market prices at tile equilibrium . One can formulate precisely in this context tile issue of manipulation . We say that a game with imperfect information is manipulable when for at least some player i, the outcome of the game that obtains when this player gives a signal si that misrepresents his characteristic s i (preference) is better (according to i) than tile outcome that obtains if he gives a correct signal about his preference . That is, denote by (S l , . . . . . V i , . . . , SO a k -I tuple of strategies of all players but i, where A denotes that the corresponding strategy is deleted ; ' i denotes "preferred to" by the ith player ; ,t" is tile outcome space, and the player's strategies are in S .
A ginne ,g is manipulable if for some strategy of player i, and some k -I tuple of strategies of all other players but 1, denoted \%here si is tile true characteristic of the ith player, and s i :~si .
This concept of manipulability formalizes tile notion tllat it is individually optimal for some player to misrepresent his characteristics, at least in some cases . As already noted, informational efficiency requires tile accurate transmission of information by prices . "Therefore, it individual deception leads to different prices than those reflecting the true market conditions, it could translate into a loss of efficiency for the market its a whole . The issue of manipulation is therefore linked to that of market efficiency . This link, however, is not simple, and is discussed in more dcfail in fire following sections . In particular, we shall define a class of games along tile lines discussed here and study their manipulability in the last section .
We now give a brief overview of existing results on the manipulation of games that seem useful for the study of manipulation in futures markets . The first results in tile theory of manipulation appeared in Gibbard (1973) . A Manipulation and Repeated Games 197 certain type of game is called "straightforward" when tile individual has no incentive to misrepresent his characteristics in his choice of strategy . 'The informational structure of straightforward games is such that players do not communicate at all . We now discuss briefly the concept of game solution in relation to the degree of communication among players because it will help formulate the problem with precision .
Imperfect information may take several forms . An agent may be unaware of tile other agents' characteristics, but he may be able to observe their strategic moves . 'This is different from a game where agents are unaware of each other's characteristics and are also unable to observe each other's moves .
The effects of different informational structures is seen more readily through the concept of solution or equilibrium . For example, in a game where each player knows nothing alulut the other's characteristics and is also unable to observe their strategic moves, the typical concept of a solution is that of dominant strategy equilibrium . In this concept, adopted by Gibbard, each player is playing his dominant strategy-that is, pi for tile ith player, which ensures him of the best possible outcome no matter what other players may he playing . Forniallv, s, is a dominant strategy for i if for any k -I tuple and for all strategies s -~s i in S, then 9( "SI " . . . , Si, . . . , SO -i S(SI, . . . , .S, . . . , SO A straightforward game is one in which giving the correct signal about one's characteristic is a dominant strategy for each player, and this gives rise to a dominant strategy equilibrium of the game . Gibbard's theorem call no\\, he simply sunlnrarized, even though a few definitions are needed for stating it with precision . For a wide family of games, the only straightforward games are dictatorial . Dictatorial games are those in which the outcome is always identical to the preferred outcome stated by one of the players, called the "dictator ." Dictatorial games (to not provide in adequate representation of markets . This result establishes (flat most nonclictatorial games are manipulable, in the sense of mot being straightforward . The phenomenon of manipulability appears therefore rather widespread . I lowever, closer examination of Gibbard's result shows that the conditions of his theorem may lie quite restrictive . I lis games generally have no dominant strategies . 'hherefore, in particular, correct signaling cannot he a dominant strategy equilibrium . "Therefore, his games fail to be straightforward may be because they do not have Dmy equilibrium . Ilis result may appear to be mostly a statement about the stringency of the concept of dominant strategy equilibrium and of the assumption that there is absolutely no communication between the players . In addition, Gibbard assumes that no restriction exists on the players' a priori preferences . ' Several later articles viewed manipulation results in a wider, and perhaps more realistic perspective (Laffont and Maskin 198(1 ; Chichilnisky and Heal 1981, 1982) . We draw from this latter literature in this discussion . The first widening was to recognize that players do observe each other's strategic moves, even though they may ignore each other's true characteristics . Second, it is seldom the case that agents have all possible characteristics, so that it suffices to study market games where the players have characteristics within a subclass of all characteristics .
The first point, about the observability of each other's strategies, leads one immediately to a different concept of solution (or equilibrium) of the game . The concept generally used in games where individuals take into account each other strategic moves is that of a Nash equilibrium . A Nash equilibrium is defined as a vector of strategies (s;, . . .,s, . . .,sk)
where strategy p is such that the ith player maximizes his utility given all other player's strategies . Formally :
For all i,g(s`;, . . .,s,, . . .,sk)=max{ur(g(s ;, . . .,s, . . . .s'k)} s;FS where ir; is a real valued utility function on outcomes representing the preference of the ith player .
A Nash equilibrium is a familiar concept in the study of market behavior : it is usually referred to as it noncooperative solution . The concept is used, for instance, for the study of markets whose agents have some degree of market power, such as monopolistic competitors . In this context it is called the Cournot solution or Cournot equilibrium . From now on we shall adopt this concept of a solution, which appears to be more realistic in the case of futures markets .
Efficiency and Manipulation
The examples in the last section made an implicit assumption about market behavior : that some agents' supply/demand behavior reflects on market prices . Obviously, in imy general equilibrium model, market prices reflect the aggregate supply and demand, which is obtained by adding up individu-
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ill's supply and demand functions . An individual's behavior therefore affects the equilibrium market prices . However, it is an assumption of the theory of competitive markets that each agent acts as if he has no influence at all on prices-that is, no market power . Our treatment of futures markets as noncooperative games with imperfect information therefore deviates from the standard competitive model in two respects . One is the lack of perfect information . The second aspect is that some of the players are aware that they may have some market power and may be able to influence prices . The concept of futures markets used here is in this sense closer to that used in the chapters by Anderson and Sundareson and by Kyle in this book . We now turn to the issue of efficiency discussed in the last section . We explained that the manipulation of a futures market may be used in defining the efficiency of this market because the market prices in this case may not convey accurate information about market conditions . There may be another source of inefficiencies, this one related to the overall allocation of resources . If individuals play the market strategically as a noncooperative game and reach a Nash equilibrium solution, this solution need not be an efficient allocation of resources, even when information is perfect . It is well known that Nash equilibrium solutions do not always yield Pareto optimal allocations among the players . In this chapter, however, we concentrate on informational efficiency, which arises more frequently in the study of financial as well as futures markets .
Using the concept of a game introduced in the previous section . we give a formal example of the behavior of futures markets as noncooperative games with imperfect information . Again, we assume that each agent an nounces a net demand schedule, which is characterized by a number of parameters, and can therefore be viewed as a vector in euclidean space . This vector is a signal of his true net demand function emerging from the optimization of individual preferences . Each component of the vector may, of course, be either positive or negative, depending on whether the agent buys or sells the particular commodity indicated by that component . We can assume without loss of generality that the initial net amount traded when the market opens is the vector q in R""', where ni denotes the miniber of delivery dates, and n the number of commodities . Opening futures prices 1) are therefore described by a positive nrn dimensional vector . A signal for agent i is a net demand schedule, a vector denoted Aq; . It is convenient, but not essential, to assume that q; also has dimension nrn-that is, q ;FR""' . Because in futures markets no immediate payment is necessary at the moment of contract-that is, there are no budget constraints-in principle a signal can he imy vector in Rwith some coordinates positive and others negative . In the final section we shall also refer to cases where the agents have budget constraints, which limit their signals to a subset of R""' .
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In its simplest and most general form, we conceive of tile game as a function that assigns to individual net demand schedule signals a market price, which is a positive vector in 11""'-that is g(Aq,, . . . , Agti.) = P r. R(" ,)
Equivalently, we may consider the outcome as a change from initial to final prices-that is, we may rewrite the game in the form g(Aq, . . . . , AqA ) = Ap = h -hn
This formalization is useful because we obtain more synrnrctrv . The strategies of the players are vectors in Rand the outcomes are vectors in lZ""' as well . The game form or layoff function is thcretorc a function
where k is the number of players . In general, of course, the image of y will be a subset of R""' . We now focus on one class of games within this context, which is used later to explore the incidence of manipulation . The goal of each player is to attain a price change as close as possible to Ap* the ideal price change far this agent given his true (current or expected) market position . For example, assume that there are two periods and that each component of the price vector denotes tile price for the same good in each of tile two periods . Assume that in the first period the agent goes long for delivery of good u on tile second period, and furthermore, that it is his private information that lie does not wish to hold good a on or after the second period . Then if this agent can induce by strategic signaling a change in market prices that keels future prices far good cr at tile first period, demoted as law as possible, and second-period slot prices for a, denoted p 2(a) as high as possible, he may be able to squcezc tile market for delivery at the second date, provided ire purchases enough in the first period for delivery at the second . I lis goal is then to obtain that change in price Ap* that maximizes tile ratio
For instance, if tile agent's net position is long, his ideal price ratio in this market would he zero . In other cases-such as those with two or more delivery dates-one may consider the ideal price as representing instead futures prices at different delivery dates . If an agent holds a portfolio with Manipulation and Repealed Games 201 different delivery elates, the ideal prices for this agent will in general be a vector whose components are positive . I low an agent may influence prices to approximate his ideal price is described in the last section . We now assume that prices are affected by the behavior of <t subset of players who have market power /' Prices will change in the same general direction of the excess demand vector of the players in 1' . More precisely, if Aq, is tile demand signal of tile ith agent with market power, then Ap will he in tile convex set of directions determining tile signals Aq; for all i in P . In particular . when all quantity signals are identical to each other-for example, to Aq (that is, everyone signals the same net demand)-then tile change in prices will also he in the same direction . 'That is Ap = XAq for some positive number Jc .
We can now describe the strategic behavior of the players . The optimal Nash strategy of the ith player, given that all other players_ in 1' are playing strategies Aq,, for j = I, . . . , k, j # i, is that strategy Aq, that yields a price change as close as possible to ;in ideal outcome Ah . where /' = { I, . . . , p) . and the minimum is taken with respect to the standard euclidean distance in R""' .
A Nash equilibrium set of strategies (Aq,*, . . . , Aq*,) is one in which for each player i, the strategy Aq'; is optimal, given that player j is playing strategy Aq~, for j = l, . . . , h, j l . There is manipulation only if tile Nash equilibrium strategy of agent i, Aq , which he chooses strategically to attain the best outcome in the game g, is a misrepresentation of is net demand Aq;, obtained under competitive assumptions from utility nraxinrization at tile competitive equilibrium market prices . If some player gains by misrepresenting his market position-for example, if it influences prices to move in a different way than they would do if lie was to represent his position accurately-the informational efficiency of futures prices in predicting subsequent spot prices will he diminished . In the last section, we show that in this type of market game manipulation will take place generally-that is, each player will in general obtain a more favorable price move by misrepresenting his position (theorem 2) . We earl further refine the result by showing that when the outcomes of the game are directions of price changes, then under these conditions there exists always one player who can attain whatever direction of price change lie desires by Manipulation (theorem I ) .
The results of theorems I and 2 show that although we have dropped the restrictions of Gibbard's theorem and consider more plausible games where agents do take into consideration each other's strategic moves, the problem of manipulation is still present . The next section will study alternatives to tile examples of games discussed here and explore tile role of disclosure in the context of repeated games .
Disclosure and Repeated Games
We have discussed examples of tile incidence of manipulation in futures markets vic%ved as noncooperative games will) imperfect information . In this section xvc analyze tile strategic behavior that arises when players play tile game relicatedly, even a(f infinitum . The incidence of manipulation is likely to decrease when the game is played by the same agents repeatedly because each player's strategic behavior is observed by tile other players . Once manipulation is exposed and the player is identified, future signals from this player may be interpreted differently . In particular, it is possible that by playing tile game repeatedly, tile manipulative player will reveal his true market position through his strategic behavior . If this is tile case, tile longer-run informational efficiency of tile futures market as a repeated game may be recovered, despite the possible incidence of manipulation in each one-shot game .
Several factors may stand on tile way of the full disclosure of an individual's position through his strategic behavior . However, at least in certain examples one can give sufficient conditions to guarantee that an optimal strategy in a repeated game is to reveal one's true market position . Such examples will be seen to require some form orl disclosure or loss of anonvrnity . I lowever . disclosure or loss of anonymity may be associated with barriers to entry, which decrease the Market's allocative efficiency . Therefore, (lie gains from informational efficiency of repeated games may he accompanied by efficiency losses from harriers to entry . A mixed policy to optimize this tradeoff may he called for . Ideally, we would consider the games discussed in the last section as played repeatedly . However, this view would lead to games on infinite dimensional strategy spaces . Therefore, we study now a simpler example of one-shot games that will then he repealed indefinitely . '['his is analogous but different from a one-shot game studied by Akerloff (19711) . An extension of our game to a supergame-that is, the game obtained by repeating this one-shot game ad infinitum-is obtained . A precedent is I leal (1976) who Manipulation and Repeated Games 203 extended Akerloff's game to a supergame and produced the first results in the area of incentives in repeated games . Because we repeat tile game indefinitely, it is simpler to assume that only two strategies are available to each player, one representing truthful demand A and the second misrepresenting it for calculated strategic advantage B . Our game differs from those of Akerloff and Heal in several ways . Heal requires that a "good quality" good obtained through trade have an intrinsic value for the player, a value that is the same for both players and is independent from what the other player's strategy is . Thus, his game has only four parameters : the value of obtaining a "good quality" good, the value of departing from s) "good quality" good, and the same two values for "bad quality" goods . Here, we need instead eight parameters because there is no intrinsic value here toil truthful strategy . This value is determined by the market response, which depends of course on the other player's strategy .
We assume that there are two players, I and 2, and define eight parameters as follows . When players I and 2 play both strategy A, tile outcome for 1 is a I I and for 2 is (3 1 , ; when I and 2 both play B the outcomes are a22 and 022 ; when I plays A and 2 plays B, the outcomes are a le and 012, respectively, and finally when 1 plays Band 2 plays A, they are a and 0 21 respectively . We By analogy with the previous game we may assume that the truthful outcome (a ,,, 011 ) is Pareto-efficient-that is, that anv other outcome which has a higher value for one of the players will necessarily have a lower value for the other . We shall also discuss cases where (a 1 ,, 011 ) is not Pareto-efficient .
The next step is to find the non-cooperative solutions of this one-shot game . We are concerned with tile cases where the game can be manipulated and wish to investigate how the repetition of this game may improve matlcrs . The game can he manipulated when the outcome of 1)l ;tying slralegy 13 (deceit) is an improvement over that of playing strategy A (stating one's truthful position) . We may assume without loss of generality that the deceitful player is l . Then if player 1 will always play strategy 13 (deceit) . Player 2 will therefore always choose between f3=, and (322 only . Under the assumption that )3 > fi2t (that is, it is preferable to respond to deceit with deceit) . the only Nash equilibrium of this game is the pair of strategies (11, B) with payoff (eye , f3 ) . 'I his will happen even though the truthful (A . /t ) strategy vector may yield a Pa re Io superior outcome-that is, even if (a . [it I) > ((e2= . fi22) , where > is the sI ;indard vector order in euclidean space R 2 . The Nash e(Iuilihrittmthat is, noncooperative beltavirn of the agents--may lead to Pareto inferior outcomes if each player has an incentive to deceive the other in the one-shot game . Such a market would not lie informationally efficient because at the equilibrium, we expect deceitful behavior of the agents . Now assume the game is played repeatedly . Consider the following infinite strategy I' For player I : to real his correct position A in the first period, and in the Ith period to play B if and only if player 2 has been deceit lulinsonic previous period s < 1 .Define d,toliethesymmetric policy for player 2 . We can now compute the discounted future payoff of this strategy for both player . 'I lie playoff of I' to player I is 2 plays 11 is where 11 < A < I is the discount factor . Similarly, the payoff to 2 of 11 if I plays T is Now . it' player 2 plays strategy 11, can player 1 benefit by departing from strategy A? Assume that from t = I to I = T, I plays A, and for 1~-T + I , 1 plays R . Then if 2 follows strategy 11, 2 will play 11 from I = T + 2 onward, and therefore . the best I can do is to play B from there onward also . Therefore, the highest payoff to I of departing from strategy Tat 
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We can now compare the payoff to strategy I' for player I , to the payoff to this deviation from I' . This is, we compare equations 6 .1 and 6 .3 . It is easy to check that the payoff of equation 6 .1 exceeds that of 6 .3 if and only if < aft -alt a22 -alt "Therefore, for sufficiently small discount rates A, the pair of strategies f',11 is always a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game . This shows that for small discount rates-that is, when players value their future trades sufficientlyone possible solution to this game is that each player acts according to his true position without attempting to manipulate the outcome . We therefore may attain informational efficiency if the discount rate is sufficiently small . Moreover, it can also he shown that for any discount rate, a Pareto-efficient solution of the game is in equilibrium of the supergame . Therefore, the truthful strategy (A,A) leads to a Pareto-efficient allocation . It follows that in such cases one may add Pareto efficiency of resource allocations to the informational efficiency of the solutions .
An interesting problem arises in those cases where the truthful strategy set (A, A) is informationally efficient but not Pareto-efficient . As discussed previously, this may arise in the Nash equilibrium of noncooperative market games even with perfect information, such as games of monopolistic competition . In such cases, it cannot be guaranteed that gaining more information about the market conditions (for example, through repeated games) will improve the outcome . More information may lead in some cases to all agents being worse off . Finally, it should be pointed out that, in general, ;my Pareto-efficient allocation of a one-shot game will he a Nash equilibrium of tile supergame .
This result implies in particular that if the truthful strategy (A, A) is Pareto efficient, it will always be a Nash equilibrium solution to the supergame .
Efficiency Gains and Losses from Disclosure
The previous section studied a one-shot game where the agents have an incentive to manipulate their signals to their advantage . It also showed sufficient conditions for this incentive to disappear when the game is repeated indefinitely . The intuitive reason is that when the game is repeated, the players build ill) reputations and may therefore internalize at least some of the losses that they may inflict on others in previous periods . The incentive to manipulate is therefore decreased . We exhibited two sufficient conditions for attaining a manipulation-free outcome . One is that the truthful strategies define a Pareto-efficient equilibrium . The other is that the agents have relatively low discount rates for the future . Clearly, the extent to which future trades matter will he rellected by more concern for one's current commercial reputation . These results lead us naturally to question the conditions under which a futures market can be considered a repeated game . This will he the first subject of this section . The second will he to explore tile implications of this on efficiency .
One factor that emerged clearly in the discussion in the last section is that some form of strategic retaliation is necessary to prevent repeated manipulation . Clearly . such a strategy would require that tile manipulating agents he identified . For example, if manipulation is followed by exit from tile market, and perhaps reentry under a different brand name, manipulation may go unchecked and he repeated indefinitely .
To formalize this concept . one reformulates the repeated game defined previously to take exit into account . Depending on the returns outside of tile garne, one may be able to formulate precisely the optimal exit policy of a manipulative agent . For example, assume that the returns outside the game sire .v dollars per period . Consider the following strategy~for player 1 . Player 1 plays tile game straight for 7' periods, then it manipulates it cm period 1 .. and leaves tile market on period 7' + 1 . Then the payoff to I of strategy : , under tile assumption that player 2 will not manipulate unless I does (that is . strategy 11) is
We may now compare the payoff of strategy I' for player 1, with the payoff of two other strategies : manipulating and staying in the market, and manipulating and exiting . Clearly it will he preferable for 1 to follow strategy l rather than tile straight strategy 7' if and only if
Notice that the choice of cheat and exit strategy becomes more attractive in two cases :
The higher is the rate of discount of the future payoffs . The higher is the payoff x outside the market, and this is independent from the stopping time .
Obviously . _r must be larger than cr22 because otherwise player 1 would never contemplate leaving the market . Also x must he smaller than a l I for this player to want to play at all . Therefore strategy t will generally he preferred to manipulating forever and will also be preferable to playing straight with high rates of discount of future payoffs .
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As a result, there is tile concern that at any point of tile game a player may manipulate and then exit . Unless a player can be fully identified in terms of his history of trades, one cannot expect the players to reveal truthfully their market positions so that newcomers, who have no market history, would normally be suspect . With full disclosure, a wedge is driven between oldtime players and newcomers, which effectively restricts entry .
When more sophisticated strategies are considered, it can be expected that a natural concept of entry fee may arise-that is, the cost associated with developing a good market reputation for the newcomers . The formal ization of such a concept would seem useful to compute tile efficiency losses associated with restricted entry arising from disclosure . Or, equivalently, it may measure the efficiency gains from anonymity, in the form of free entry . Therefore, a measure of the informational efficiency gained by disclosure (in which case we may have a repeated and manipulation-free game) and the efficiency losses due to restricted entry caused by full disclosure would seem required .
Results for One-Shot Cames and Applications in this section we prove results on the manipulation of games with imperfect information . At the end of the section we shall also discuss their possible applications for tile analysis of futures markets .
Let us assume that there are k>2 players with market power . We shall examine their Nash strategies and the corresponding outcomes of a noncooperative game . The game is defined by a game form g, a strategy set S in R" for each player, and an outcome set X in R" . Each strategy is a vector representing a net demand schedule for it commodities . The game form is a continuous function g : (R" )k --> X, which assigns to each k-tuple of strategies an outcome that is a direction of price change D,, in R", or else no change at all-that is, the vector (0, . . . , tl) .
We shall assume that each player knows g, X, and S, and that they observe each other's moves, player is preferred direction of price change is denoted D/r ; . To provide a simple proof of our next result, we shall look at tile special case k = 2, n = 2 . The results in this section hold true for higher dimensional cases, but the proofs require more complex tools of algebraic topology .
THEOREM I . Considera garneg: (RT --~-R2 defined as above. Asstone that prices move in the direction of a convex combination of the changes ill net demands ofthe agents. There then evists a /)layer n,lro i.s always able to secure, as a Nash equilibriton otitcorne, his preferred direction of price change, for anv (nonzero) strategies the other is playing . To attain this outcome, this player will generally misrepresent his true (ne() demand, but his strategic net demand vector need never have a higher absolute vahte than that of tile outer player . 20 8 the Industrial Organization of Futures Markets PI-00f. Because ,g' 111apS Strategies into directions of price chatlges, and such directions are in a one-to-one correspondence will] points in (lie unit circle ,S' of R`, we may consider g : (R2)2 -> S' . We shall now restrict ourselves to nonzero strategies, so we may look at g : (R 2 -)M)''5' We study next file restriction of the slap g to the set (S I ) 2 C (R 2 -10})2-that is following subsets : and and g : (S 1 ) 2 , S 1
We may define file degree of g restricted to file diagonal set D = ; (x,, r,) e (S   1 ) 2 : x, = x 2 }, because D is horneonlorphic to the circles S' in R2 (Chichilniskv 19 ; 11) .
The condition that [)rice changes in file direction of positive linear cool dinatior1 demands implies that when all individual demands are c,1-lincar, 111cy n1,we in 111e same (lit Since (leg g/D = I, this implies by equation 6 .5 and 6 .6 that of the two degrees on (11e right side of equation 6 .7, one must be zero, and the other one . Assume without loss of generality that deg g/T, = I and (leg g1T2 = (l . This implies that when player 2 plays e in .S 1 for any outcome D';, in S 1 there exists an x(1',,) in S' such that g(x . v ( ,) = U" . By continuity of g, this is also true for any other r in S 1 , y -y, 'I his proves that the first player can always Manipulation and Repeated Games 209 find a Nash strategy that ensures him of his preferred outcome, no matter what strategy player 2 plays . The argument is now easily extended to strategies in R2 . For any y in R2 , consider the circle .S' (y) centered in the origin, passing through y . Because g is defined on R2 , in particular g is defined on S 1 (y), and thus the preceding argument applies to this circle-that is, to the map
This proves that for the game g : (R`)`_ _,. S1 , the Nash response function of player I has always D'', as its outcome-that is, g(x(y), y) = 1)'J' till */, in R 2 . Because the Nash equilibrium is in the intersection of both response functions of file [)layers, the proof" of the theorem is complete .
The following is an example of a game g as in theorem 1 . (see llurwicz 1972, 1979) . We consider first a pure exchange market with two persons and two goods . Given an initial endowment W; and a price p, each agent determines a utility-maximizing bundle z*(p) . As the price p varies, the geometric locus of z * (h) in the commodity space constitutes the offer curve of this agent .
One may consider the game where each individual chooses strategically an offer curve to maxinlize his strictly convex preference subject to a budget constraint depending on W; . Given a pair of such strategies, denoted /1 1 and 11 2 , the outcome of the Walras game is defined by the determination of the market clearing prices for 11, and h 2 and the subsequent selection of the corresponding Walras equilibrium allocation . In the case of multiple solutions, one is chosen . 1-lurwicz has shown that the set of Nash allocations of the preceding game, which corresponds to equilibria in Nash strategies, coincides with tile interior of the lens L* constituted by the true offer curves . In general, therefore, manipulation of file market will take place, in the sense that the Nash solutions of the Walras game when agents play strategically is different from the set of Walrasian equilibrium market allocations .
We consider now a special case of the preceding game .
Given inital endowments W i and preferences U;, i = 1, . . . , k (k agents), let E(Wi, Ui) be the set of Walrasian equilibria of the pure exchange economy described by (Wi , Ui)i = l, . . . , k . We assume that initial en dowments (Wi ) are given, and that the preferences Ui, i = 1, . . . , k, may vary over a family of preferences parameterized by vectors in R" (11 goods) . This is a restricted domain assumption . For example, for n = 3, k = 2 let U, = min(a, .r . b,y, c i z) and U2 = nlin((I'x, bw, c_' Z), so aril U, is fully described by the three ----dimensional vector (a,, b,, c,) and U, by (a,, b, c,) . Alternatively consider a fainlily of Cobb-Douglas utilities I U, _ ( .r", vti , z'')} each utility U; indexed by a vector in euclideail slrlce, naillCly
We shall assume that there exists a continuous map (() from utilities to equilibria where ch assigns a Walrasian equilibria to each utility U ; ill a continuous fashion . Because the utilities U;'s are assumed to be characterized by vectors in R" . then the map cir can lie written as (~:
where car (r ;, . . . , r;,, . . . , r' ;) is a Walrasian e(Iuilibria elf the pure exchange economy (ri . . . . , r;, . . . . , rr ', ; {W,}) with initial endowments {If',} and preferences {U ;} represented by the nk vector of parameters i If we now consider the equilibrium price lr ,t supporting the Walrasian eyuilibria allocation (1)(r ;, {W;}), then we obtain from car a continuous slap g, : (R")k , R" assigning to (ri, . . . , r;,) the eyuilibria price of This map satisfies the conditions statement of theorem 1, defining a game form ,g' : (R") k -4 IV . The strategy of the All player is therefore an Itdimensional vector . . . , r;,) in R" representing his preference, or corresponding demand schedule . Each individual vector will represent a variation from an initial vector of parameters (1 11 ,, . . . , r;;) . Individual strategies are variations over a given preference or initial demand schedule . We now make the following additional assumption :
Regularif"v assnrnplion : 'The equilibrium price p* varies continuously as a function of individual demands in the direction of the convex combination of changes in individual demands . This condition can he described intu itively by saying that the equilibrium price moves in a certain direction whenever individual utilities change so as to assign higher utilities to commodity bundles in that direction . ']'his condition can be weakened significantly, for instance to request that the trial) of from (R")r< into R" has Manipulation and Repeated Games 211 degree 1 over certain subsets . In view of our two assumptions, the game form as clefined by the Walras game satisfies all the conditions of theorem 1, and therefore the results of theorem l apply to this example . We may also refer to cases where, because of constraints, the players may not play all possible net demand vectors as strategies . In the twodimensional case, we may consider therefore that the strategies open to each player are restricted to a box in R2 , denoted Z2. The manipulation of such games was studied in Chichilnisky and Heal (1982) , and we quote here those results .
TIlEOREM 2 . Let g be a regular" garne with strategies in Z2 for each player, and outcomes in a convex set of R2 (that is, the price space) . Then g is nonmanipulable in Nash equilibrium only if g is locally ,simple-that is, locally a constant or locally dictatorial. Furthermore, locally constant or dictatorial gatnes are nowhere dense in the fancily of continuous game forms g: Z2 --> R2. Therefore, generically, games g: Z2 --* R2 are manipulable.
For a proof see theorem 2 and proposition 5 of Chichilnisky and Heal (1982) .
We now give a corollary of theorem I that will be used in the following application to futures markets : COROLLARY l . Let g: (R 2) 2 -R2 be a garne as in theorem 1 . Then there always exists a planer that can ensure that the price of one of the goods will move in the opposite direction of his net demand vector for this good, at least in some ranges of his demand . Proof. This follows from the proof of theorem 1 . The fact that deg/TZ = 0 implies, together with the convex hull condition, that the set of values of g on the set T2 , that is {g(xo, Y) : YES, (xn)} does not cover TZ . That is, as the net demand vector y of the second agent describes clockwise the circle Si (x(j ), the outcome must move counterclockwise at least for some values of y . Therefore, as net demand of player 2 increases for one good, the price change moves in the opposite direction .
This completes the proof . We now explore an application of theorem 1 and its corollary 1 to a particular example of manipulation of futures markets, related to what is sometimes called a market squeeze (for a discussion and definitions, see for example Kyle, chapter 5, this volume) .
Example 2: Market squeezes and the competitive fringe . For this example we must specify in more detail the institutional framework of the problem . We shall assume that there are two types of agents, those with market power and 21 2
The Industrial Organization of Futures Markets those without it . The latter arc called the "competitive fringe ." TI]cy are distinguished in operational terms by the fact that when operations are contractual but not physical (that is, no physical goods are exchanged, only contracts), tire prices are determined by the ntarkct behavior of tlic players with market power . I however, if as delivery dale arrives physical deliveries take place, then the price changes are inllucnccd by the plivsical volumes of demands and supplies of all players, including those without market power . until physical markets clear . We shall assume, as usual, that price changes move in the same general direction as aggregate excess demands .
In our example . there is one good a and two periods . We shall consider two prices : Ir, (a) denotes the futures price of a at period 1 . and 1) 2 (,,) represents the spot price of a ill period 2 . Obviously, will] perlect informa tion] and no manipulation these two prices should he equal but for storage costs . As we will see . however . where there exist agents with market power ill period I . it will be possible (under certain conditions) too drive a wedge llctN\rcn these two prices to tile advantage of tile manipulative agent . \1'c shall consider a case where file first period is very close too the dclivciv date (of second period) . So that tire c1caring mouse is not able to close flu \\edg e through its periodic monitoring operations . Assume that there arc two players will] market power denoted I and 2 and a competitive Iringe of undetermined size . Assume that the direction of price change is as before in the convex hull of player 1 and player 2's net futures contract demand for good a (to he delivered at date 2) . Then corollary 2 establishes that at least for one agent, say player l, it will be possible in some cases to increase its demand for a (to he delivered at date 2) and go sufficiently long without at the same time increasing, or even while decreasing, the futures price at which lie contracts ill period 1 . An intuitive explanation of this case could he as follows . If in previous periods agent I had traded with tin agent with market power denoted 2, and 2 went sufficiently short, then in period 1, tile second agent could prevent tile futures price of a from rising-for example, while agent I goes long by buying only from the competitive fringe . Because we assumed that until physical trade takes place, the competitive fringe does not affect market prices, futures prices for a remains low, even as player I goes sufficiently long that his demand exceeds physical supplies in period 2 . The manipulation is mow completed . As period 2 arrives, if player I purchased more than tile total physical quantities available, then obviously the sport price of good a will rise in period 2 . This increase will give a net gain to player I if lie accepts monetary compensation for the lack of delivery . This gain, of course, will only be meaningful if player I (lid not actually buy futures ill good a because he needed good a in period 2 ; contrary to what lie expressed about his demand for a in period 1, he does not actually need to consume (I ill period 2, so he can materialize tile gain of the price wedge lie produced through manipulation .
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This result has two key elements . First, as provided by theorem I and corollary I , ill period I tine agent may increase his futures demand for good a and get sufficiently long without increasing his futures price in contracts at period I . The competitive fringe that went short in the aggregate ill period I for delivery in period 2 will affect spot prices in the second period, because then delivery is enforced, so that the other physical scarcity of quantities traded affects spot prices .
A closer look at agent I's strategy suggests that this agent may do well to buy first from those agents with the most market power . If they go short, they may help prevent increases in futures prices, thus allowing player I to continue to buy from the competitive fringe at lower prices and increase his long position significantly just ill) to the (late where delivery must take place . 3 . That is, a priori each player may have any possible preference among different commodities . The game is supposed to be straightforward with respect to any arbitrarily given set of players, each of which may have only possible preference . a . A regular game is one whose game form g : R" --~R" satisfies generic transvcrsality conditions ; sec Chichilnisky and I Ieal (1951) .
